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Is electoral competition good for political selection? To address this issue, we introduce a 
theoretical model in which ideological parties select candidates between party loyalists and 
experts, and allocate them into the electoral districts. Non-ideological voters, who care about 
national and local policies, strongly prefer experts. We show that parties compete on good 
politicians by allocating them to the most contestable districts. Empirical evidence on Italian 
members of parliament confirms this prediction. We find that politicians with higher ex-ante 
quality − as measured by years of schooling, previous market income, and local government 
experience − are more likely to run in a contestable district. Indeed, despite being different on 
average, the characteristics of politicians belonging to opposite parties converge to high-
quality levels in close races. Furthermore, politicians elected in contestable districts make 
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In politics, personal identity matters. A lot. Would the UK have had a season of privatization
without the leading role of Margareth Thatcher, or the US a New Deal without Franklin
Delano Roosevelt? How crucial was Fidel Castro in Cuba’s recent history? And what would
have happened to the US had Bob Kennedy become its 37th president? A recent literature
has recognized the crucial relevance of the identity of leading politicians in taking policy
decisions and ultimately in shaping the development of the entire nation (e.g., see Jones and
Olken, 2005).1 Similar considerations on the crucial role played by some leading persons
(that is, CEOs) apply also to the business sector (e.g., see Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).
If identity matters, selecting good politicians becomes ever more crucial. But how to
achieve an eﬃcient process of political recruitment? In this paper, we examine the eﬀect of
political competition on the selection and allocation of political candidates across electoral
districts featuring diﬀerent degrees of contestability. Competition for electoral support by the
voters requires the parties running for election to accurately select their political candidates
into districts in order to improve their chances of winning the election. Were thus Stigler
(1972) and Wittman (1989) right in claiming that competition is good also for politics?
Should we be even more bold in arguing that the dividend of political competition arises
from the selection of better politicians?
To address these questions, we introduce a model of political selection in a majoritarian
system. The novelty of the model is to allow for a clear role of the party (leaders) in
selecting political candidates and allocating them to diﬀerent electoral districts. Rather than
analyzing the self-selection of political candidates—and thus the supply of politicians, as most
of the political economy literature—we concentrate on the demand of politicians by parties
(leaders). Potential candidates diﬀer ex ante in their identity, namely in their quality type and
party loyalty. Quality is perfectly observable by the voters, and good (that is, high-quality)
politicians are favorably valued by all non-ideological voters. Parties will therefore have to
compete on good politicians. Political competition is captured by the degree of contestability
of each electoral district. As in Besley and Preston (2007), the electoral competition at the
district level depends on the relative share of aligned and swing voters. More swing voters and
1See Besley (2005) for a general perspective on the economic analysis of political selection.
1a more equal share of the voters aligned to the two parties increase the electoral contestability
of a district. An original feature of our model is to allow the parties to target speciﬁc districts
by allocating a particular type of candidate. Furthermore, unlike most existing work in the
literature, we focus on the eﬀect of political competition on the primal party decision, that is,
the selection and allocation of politicians, rather than on the policy choice. Our theoretical
model predicts that electoral competition has beneﬁcial eﬀects, since parties choose to send
their high-quality politicians to the most contestable districts.
To test this prediction, we use a recent dataset on all Italian members of parliament
elected in majoritarian (single-member) districts from 1994 to 2006. In that period, Italy
represented the perfect testing ground of our theoretical model for several reasons. First,
parties (leaders) played a crucial role in the recruitment of political candidates. Second, a
majoritarian system was used to elect one of the largest assemblies in the world. Third, for
historical reasons, there was a lot of geographic variation in the ideological strongholds of the
two major political coalitions (center-right versus center-left). All of these features provide a
considerable amount of within-country variation in the degree of political contestability. We
use this variation as a treatment and evaluate its eﬀect on political selection.
In particular, to measure the degree of political contestability of a single electoral dis-
trict, we construct two diﬀerent indicators: (i) the margin of victory in the previous political
election; and (ii) the district-speciﬁc ratio of the number of swing voters over the diﬀerence
between the ideological voters of the two main coalitions. The latter indicator is estimated
using electoral data from the previous European elections, which take place under a propor-
tional system and are largely believed to capture ideological voting.
Ex-ante quality by the politicians is instead captured by diﬀerent measures, such as
years of schooling, previous market income, and past experience in local governments. The
rationale for each measure is simple. Years of schooling capture the acquisition of formal
human capital and skills.2 Preelection income, controlling for the occupational type, is a
measure of market success and ability. The use of administrative experience is linked to the
idea that lower-level elections can be used by high-quality politicians to build reputation
2Besley and Reynal-Querol (2009) use the same measure to assess political selection in democracy versus
autocracy. Zhang and Congleton (2008) ﬁnd a positive correlation between the educational level of US
Presidents and aggregate economic outcomes.
2and by voters to screen better candidates.3 Consistently with our theoretical framework,
we ﬁnd evidence of an ex-ante selection eﬀect of political competition: politicians with more
years of schooling, higher preelection income, and more local experiences tend to be allocated
to contestable (nonsafe) districts. Interestingly, although the two main political coalitions
show very diﬀerent patters of political selection (with the center-right coalition recruiting
politicians with higher education, and the center-left selecting more women and politicians
with previous administrative experience), evidence from a regression discontinuity design
shows that both parties converge to the same high-quality type in close races. In other
words, only when the going gets tough, the tough candidates get the job from their parties.
To capture ex-post quality by the elected oﬃcials, we consider the absenteeism rate in
electronic parliament votes, which we consider a proxy for shirking or rent-seeking.4 Our
empirical evidence shows that politicians elected in contestable districts display a lower ab-
senteeism rate. This is consistent with the selection of better politicians in those districts,
but may also be driven by reelection incentives. To disentangle the two channels, we exploit
some (exogenous) changes in political alliances forced by national leaders, which had the ef-
fect of altering the degree of contestability of certain districts from one election to the next.5
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of political selection strongly dominates, because the
ex-ante contestability of the district has a sizable impact on performance even if we control
for the altered reelection incentives. An incentive eﬀect does however exist, particularly for
low-quality politicians, as we ﬁnd that, when a safe district turns contestable, low-quality
incumbent politicians tend to exert more eﬀort.
Our results on Italy point to the existence of a selection dividend of political competition,
which can be extended to countries with a majoritarian electoral rule and strong parties,
such as the UK. Moreover, we expect the same positive association between the ex-ante
quality of politicians and political competition to hold even in majoritarian environments
with a weak party structure, such as the US. For example, this will occur if primary voters
3On this point, from a theoretical perspective, see Cooter (2002) and Myerson (2006).
4For instance, Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2008) show that the absenteeism rate is positively
associated with the amount of outside income by members of parliament.
5The instability of the party system during the period that followed the judiciary scandals known as “Mani
pulite” (1992-94) and the switch from a proportional to a majoritarian electoral rule in 1994, produced
national changes in political alliances both in the right-wing and left-wing coalitions, which exogenously
aﬀected the contestability of a few districts in diﬀerent elections. See Section 4.2 for a discussion.
3selecting their party’s candidate trade oﬀ ideological loyalty for better skills, in order to
attract independent voters in the true election. More generally, whenever non-aligned voters
care about the personal attributes of candidates and the electoral race is tight, we expect
competition on good politicians. Therefore, from a normative perspective, our ﬁndings call
for institutions and policies able to: i) increase voters’ information and awareness about the
quality of political candidates; and ii) enhance the degree of contestability of electoral races.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related literature.
Section 3 introduces our theoretical framework and derives the main results regarding the
selection of candidates into the electoral districts. Section 4 describes the data and the
institutional framework, while the estimation strategy and the empirical results are presented
in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. Our theoretical framework shares some
features with the models introduced by Alesina (1988) and Besley and Preston (2007). Two
ideological parties compete for the votes of aligned (or committed) voters and of swing voters.
However, as in Alesina (1988), parties’ platforms need not to converge. The degree of political
competition depends on the distribution of swing and aligned voters into electoral districts.6
Yet, while in Besley and Preston (2007) parties choose an economy-wide policy and are
unable to target speciﬁc districts, our novelty is to assign to the parties the primal roles of
selecting candidates and allocating them into the electoral districts. This allocation decision
is crucial in our setting, as it allows the parties to target speciﬁc districts. The importance of
district-speciﬁc policies to win the election has been carefully evaluated by Stromberg (2008),
who examined the distribution of visits to the diﬀerent US states by presidential candidates.7
In our framework, parties select politicians according to their identity. As in Besley
(2005), candidates diﬀer in their quality, that is, in their ability or expertise in problem
6In the literature on the estimation of seat-vote curves, Coate and Knight (2007) use a similar model with
a distribution of democrats, republicans, and independents across districts to examine optimal districting.
7Persico, Rodriguez-Pueblita, and Silverman (2008) examine how parties that are internally divided into
factions determine the allocation of pork spending. To the extent that internal factions occur along geograph-
ical lines, their results have implications for geographical targeting. Persson and Tabellini (2000), Lizzeri and
Persico (2001), and Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) study the political incentives for policies
targeted at speciﬁc districts under alternative electoral rules (that is, proportional versus majoritarian).
4solving. This feature is valued by the non-ideological voters, and hence by the political
parties seeking to win the election. Our model of political selection concentrates in fact on
the choice of political candidates by the party. This demand for politicians has largely been
neglected in the literature, despite the predominant role played by (strong) political parties
in most of contemporaneous democracies. A notable exception is represented by Carrillo and
Mariotti (2001), who analyze the party decision between an experienced, and thus known,
incumbent and a new candidate of uncertain quality. In an asymmetric information setting,
they show that parties may have an incentive to conﬁrm mediocre incumbents. Mattozzi and
Merlo (2006) focus instead on the competition between parties and lobbying ﬁrms in hiring
political candidates. In their framework, parties may ﬁnd it optimal to attract low-quality
politicians, the best individuals being out of reach.
There exists instead a recent and growing literature on the supply (or self-selection) of
politicians (see Besley, 2005, for a review). Following the tradition of the citizen-candidate
framework (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996), this literature has analyzed
the determinants that bring individuals to enter the political market and to compete for
election. A common theme has thus been how to attract good politicians. Models that
predict adverse selection in politics (Besley, 2004; Caselli and Morelli, 2004) are based on the
assumption that the private and political sectors are mutually exclusive, and therefore low-
quality individuals have a lower opportunity cost of running for oﬃce.8 Mattozzi and Merlo
(2008) emphasize the role of the public oﬃce in signaling ability. In their framework, some
high-ability citizens decide to serve for a short period, after which they leave parliament
and capitalize on their political experience (see also Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo, 2005).
Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2008) suggest that allowing for outside income
while in parliament may lead to positive sorting. Finally, Dal Bo and Di Tella (2003) and
Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Di Tella (2006) suggest that, besides monetary compensations or bribes,
self-selection can also be aﬀected by threats and violence. Also recent empirical studies have
investigated the eﬀect of monetary incentives on politicians’ self-selection. Gagliarducci and
Nannicini (2008) and Ferraz and Finan (2008) use a quasi-experimental setup and ﬁnd that a
higher remuneration attracts more skilled individuals into politics, enhancing both political
8Messner and Polborn (2004) also predict negative sorting, although in their case the rationale for adverse
selection is that high-quality citizens free-ride on low-quality ones, because for the former the attractiveness
of the public oﬃce is low. See also Poutvaara and Takalo (2007) on the same issues.
5selection and performance. However, using data on Italian members of parliament, Merlo et
al. (2009) show a negative association over time between the parliament salary and politicians’
quality (as measured for instance by educational attainments).
A recent literature examines the eﬀect of political competition on policy outcomes. Besley,
Persson, and Sturm (2008) use diﬀerent measures of the degree of political competition in
US local elections, and ﬁnd evidence of a positive eﬀect of competition on growth enhancing
policies and, ultimately, on economic growth. Stromberg (2008) analyzes how US presiden-
tial candidates allocate resources across states to maximize their probability of winning the
election, and shows that this allocation is aﬀected by the number of electoral votes and fore-
cast uncertainty. Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder (2009) show that political dynasties (that is,
intergenerational transmission of political power and elected oﬃces) are less likely to emerge
in competitive environments. Lizzeri and Persico (2005) argue instead that more electoral
competition, deﬁned as lower barriers to entry in the party system, may increase the number
of competing political parties and lead to ineﬃcient special-interest policies.
3 The Model
Our model describes the allocation of political candidates into electoral districts by two
parties that compete in a majoritarian election. Parties have diﬀerent preferences over a
national policy, Y . Since policies are set by the winning party, parties (leaders) seek to
win the election, in order to implement a suitable policy. Before the election, parties have
to allocate their candidates in the districts. Candidates can be loyalists—to the party—
or experts. Loyalists provide party services, while experts are better equipped at problem
solving, but less willing to follow the party lines. Voters care about national and local policies.
They can be of three types: supporters of either party or centrist, that is, not aligned to
any party. We embed the voting decision of the centrist voters in a standard probabilistic
voting model (see Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). Since centrist voters strongly prefer to have
experts in their districts, the decision of where to allocate the candidates carries important
implications for winning the election.
63.1 The Set-up
We consider two parties, L and R, which derive utility from a national policy, Y . Their
preferences are represented respectively by VL (Y ) and VR (Y ). Since parties have diﬀerent
preferences, their bliss point over the national policy will also diﬀer, b YL 6= b YR. It is useful,
albeit not crucial, to consider that this national policy may depend on the share of experts
and loyalists in the party list, i.e., Yi = Yi (µ), where µ represents the share of experts in
the party list. The main role of the party (leaders) before the election is to allocate the
candidates into the electoral districts. After the election, the winning party sets the national
policy, Y , and each winning candidate provides constituency service for its district.
Candidates can be of two types: loyalists (L) or experts (E). Loyalists exert most of their
eﬀort to provide party services or rents, and are under the party direct control. Experts, on
the other hand, are problem solvers; they may also be (relatively) loyal to the party, but they
provide fewer party services, since their eﬀort is predominantly targeted at other policies.
We consider three groups of voters. Voters in group L and R are core supporters and
always vote for party L and R, respectively. Voters in group C care instead about the national
and local policy, that is, in their electoral district. Hence, political candidates play a double
role for the voters. Besides aﬀecting the national policy, Y (µ), they provide constituency
service, for instance by bringing the attention of the national government to local instances
that aﬀect their district. The utility that group C voters living in district k derive from the
















where Yi is party-i national policy, zk
j is candidate-j policy in district k, and ρ measures
the relative importance to the voters of the local versus the national policy. To further
characterize these preferences, without loss of generality, we assume that when the two parties
select the same share of experts, their national policies provide the same utility to these C
voters. That is, VC (YL (µL)) = VC (YR (µR)) for µL = µR, although YL (µL) 6= YR (µR).9
Moreover, these voters’ utility from the national policy is increasing in the share of experts,
∂VC (Yi (µi))/∂µi > 0.
9This property can easily be derived in an environment in which the two parties have a symmetric bias
in their preferences over Y with respect to the centrist voters (see Galasso and Nannicini, 2009).
7At the local level, centrist voters prefer to have expert candidates in their districts. In
fact, we assume that VC (EL) = VC (ER) > VC (LL) = VC (LR), where Ei and Li represent,
respectively, the policy chosen at the local level by a party-i expert and loyalist.
Finally, according to the probabilistic voting approach, we assume that these voters may
feel ideologically closer to one party or another. The ideological characteristic of each centrist
voter is indexed by s, with s > 0 if the voter is closer to party R, and vice versa. The
distribution of ideology among centrist voters is assumed to be uniform. In particular, to
simplify the notation, we consider s ∼ U [−1/2,1/2]. The centrist voters’ decision is also
aﬀected by a common popularity shock to the parties, which occurs before the election and
may modify the perception, δ, that all centrist voters have about the image of the two parties.
In particular, if δ > 0, party R gains popularity from this pre-electoral image shock and vice
versa for δ < 0. Again, as it is customary in this class of probabilistic voting models, we






with ψ > 0.
To summarize, a centrist voter will support party L if the utility obtained by the (national
and local) policy adopted by party L is larger than the sum of the ideological idiosyncratic
component, s, of the common shock, δ, and of the utility obtained by party R. That is, a












− s − δ > 0.
3.2 Voters and Districts
The incentives for the parties to allocate their candidates in the diﬀerent districts depend
largely on the behavior of the centrist voters. In fact, given its preferred national policy,
or equivalently the share of experts and loyalists in the party list, a party needs to win the
election in order to be able to set up the actual policy. Ultimately, parties need to convince
the centrist voters by competing on good politicians.
The distribution of the three groups of voters in the electoral districts determines the
districts where the electoral race is tight, and those where instead one of the two parties has
a substantial advantage. Call λ
j
k the share of type-j voters in district k with j = {L,C,R}.
We assume that the share of type-C (centrist) voters is constant across district, that is,
λC









8When parties L and R have an equal share of aligned voters in the district—and hence there is
maximum electoral contestability—this index is equal to zero, λk = 0; while higher (positive)
and lower (negative) values indicate less contestability. Moreover, it is easy to see that party L
always wins in those districts with λk < −1/2, in which group-L voters represent a majority
of the electorate; while party R always prevails in districts with λk > 1/2. Hence, only
districts with intermediate values of λk ∈ [−1/2,1/2] are contestable. To characterize the
distribution of voters’ type across districts, we consider a continuum of districts, characterized







. We refer to the cumulative distribution as G(λk).
We are now in the position to assess the probability that a party—e.g., party L—wins a
contestable district k. Call e s the ideology of the swing voter, that is, of the centrist voter












− δ, and all
centrist voters with ideology s < e s will support party L. To win district k, the sum of type-L
voters (λL
k) and of the votes that party L obtains from the centrist voters has to exceed 50%.
It is easy to see that this occurs for e s > λk. Thus, the probability of party L winning district
k—call it Πk






















− λk = dk
	
(3)
where dk can be interpreted as a measure of the ex-post contestability of district k, that is,
after that the parties’ national policy and allocation of candidates are known to the voters.
Since the popularity shock is uniformly distributed with density ψ, we can rewrite equation
3 as Πk
L = 1
2 + ψdk. If the two parties converge to the same allocation of candidates, and to
national policies that provide the same utility to the centrist voters, then dk = −λk. However,
parties can use the allocation of candidates to modify dk, and thus their chance of winning
any district k.
3.3 Allocation of Candidates
To understand the choice of the allocation of candidates into districts, it is convenient to
summarize the timing of events. Parties move ﬁrst. Before the election, they choose how to
allocate their loyal and expert candidates into the diﬀerent electoral districts. The share of
9loyalists and experts in each party (µL,µR) is taken as given, and also the national policies
(YL,YR) are assumed to be exogenous.10 The two parties take their allocation decision
independently and simultaneously; they know the distribution of the popularity shock taking
place before the election, but not its realization. After the popularity shock has occurred,
centrist voters decide who to support between the two candidates running in their electoral
district. Centrist voters care about national and local policies. After the election, the winning
party determines the national policy and the winning candidate chooses the local policy.
Parties are entitled to set the national policy only if they win the election. Hence, they
will use their allocation decision in order to maximize the expected utility (for party L):
ΠLVL (YL) + (1 − ΠL)VL (YR) (4)
where ΠL represents party-L probability of winning the election and VL (Yi) is party-L utility
when the national policy is selected by party i. Since YL and YR are given, and VL (YL) >
VL (YR), party L will seek to maximize its probability of winning the election, ΠL; and
analogously for party R.
With a ﬁxed share of experts for parties L and R, respectively µL and µR, and given
the national policies YL and YR—possibly determined by these shares— parties compete by
allocating experts to the crucial districts. The diﬀerence in utility provided to the centrist
































where D = VC (YL) − VC (YR) is exogenous, and depends on the given national policies. It
simpliﬁes the analysis to consider that both parties have the same share of experts to allocate,
µ = µL = µR, and therefore D = 0.11
As experts are more valuable than loyalists to the centrist voters, allocating an expert
to a district k, where the other party sent a loyalist, amounts to increase their utility by
a positive wedge, W = ρ[VC (E) − VC (L)]. More centrist voters in that district will then
10In Galasso and Nannicini (2009), we endogenize the selection of candidates in a majoritarian (and propor-
tional) system. Selecting the share of experts to be allocated introduces an additional trade-oﬀ for the party.
More experts lead to policies that are closer to the swing voters and hence increase the party’s probability
of winning the election; but more loyalists implement policies that are closer to the party’s bliss point.
11In Galasso and Nannicini (2009), we show that this arises as an equilibrium property of the political
selection decision.
10favor party L. Hence, parties compete on good politicians (the experts) to increase their
probability of winning a contestable district.
To understand the logic behind this simultaneous allocation game, suppose that only loyal
candidates have been sent to districts, and are thus perfectly matched, that is, every party-L










= VC (L)−VC (L) = 0.
By equation 3, party L thus wins a district k if δ < dk = −λk. Moreover, given the
distribution of districts (λk), party L wins the elections—that is, it obtains more than 50%
of the districts—if δ < d0 = 0. In this case, party L wins all the districts with λk < 0, as
shown in Figure 1; whereas it ties the election for δ = d0 = 0. Thus, the marginal (or pivotal)
districts to win are in a small interval around λk = 0 (henceforth, λ0). It is convenient to
represent an interval around λ0 as [λε,λΞ], with λ0 − λε = λΞ − λ0 = ε small enough.
Suppose now that party L sends experts to the district interval [λ0,λΞ]. Using again
equation 3, it is easy to see that party L will now be more likely to win those districts.
In fact, party L will win district λ0 even for a worse (i.e., larger) realization of the shock,
that is, for δ < W. Deﬁne the district λw = −W, such that dw = W. Then, if party L
allocates an expert to the most contestable district, λ0, where party R has instead sent a
loyalist, party L will win this district with a probability which is the same as the probability
of winning district λw < 0 (which is biased in favor of party L) when both parties send there
a loyalist. Hence, with experts in the district interval [λ0,λΞ], party L would win the election
for δ = d0 = 0, rather than just tying it (see Figure 2). And analogously for party R in the
interval [λ,λ0]. Also for party R we can deﬁne a district λW = W with dW = −W, so that
if party R allocates an expert to λ0 and party L a loyalist, the probability of winning in λ0
is equal to the probability of winning in λW (when both parties send there a loyalist).
Districts λw and λW represent crucial thresholds, respectively for party L and R. To
see this, suppose that party R only allocates loyalists; then party L would maximize its
probability of winning the election by sending experts to all districts between λw and λΞ.
In this case, party L would win the election if δ ≤ dw = −λw; and allocating an additional
expert in any district would not modify this probability. It is convenient to deﬁne the mass
of districts included between λw and λ0 as η/2; that is, [G(λ0) − G(λw)] = η/2. Then, η/2
experts would be needed by party L to span the districts between λw and λ0. The same logic
11applies to party R, with the threshold district being λW, and [G(λW) − G(λ0)] = η/2.12
Before turning to the next proposition, which characterizes the equilibrium allocation
of candidates, it is convenient to introduce some deﬁnitions. Deﬁne ΛL, party-L allocation
of experts, as the union of the district intervals ΛL
i = [λi
I,λi
II] where party L allocates its
experts, ΛL = ∪iΛL
i , and analogously ΛR for party R.
Proposition 1. Parties allocate experts in district intervals that include the most contestable
district λ0.










I < λε and
λi
II > λW.
(II) For µ ≤ η/2, party L allocation of experts is ΛL = [λ0,λB], such that G(λB) = 1/2+µ,
and party R allocation is ΛR = [λb,λ0], such that G(λb) = 1/2 − µ.
Proof. See Appendix.
In words, as previously argued, allocation matters in the districts [λw,λΞ] for party L,
and [λε,λW] for party R, where sending an expert may actually change the probability of
winning the election. For µ > η/2, having enough experts, both parties will hence send
them to cover these critical districts. The allocation of additional experts does not aﬀect the
probability of winning the election, although it modiﬁes the share of seats obtained by the
party. When parties are instead supply constrained in the share of experts, µ < η/2, the
allocation strategy changes radically. Rather than concentrating their experts on a subset of
the districts that are in their favor, parties prefer to use their few experts to try to win the
districts that are (weakly) in favor of the other party.
The bottom panels of Figures 3 through 5 provide a graphical representation of equilib-
rium allocations described in the proposition above. Figure 3 displays a case in which parties
have many experts (µ > η/2) and match candidates’ type in every district (see bottom panel).
The probability of winning a district k only depends on its idiosyncratic characteristic, λk
12Notice that the mass of crucial districts between λw and λW is equal to η = 2λ
C
1−λC ρ(VC (E) − VC (L)).
The share of experts needed to cover all of them thus depends positively on the proportion of centrist voters
(λC), on the relative importance of the local policy (ρ), and on the value of an expert in the district.
12(see top panel). Figure 4 (bottom panel) presents instead a symmetric equilibrium allocation
(still for µ > η/2) in which parties span their experts on the relevant contestable districts
biased in their favor, and send additional experts to the districts that are more favorable
to the opposing party. The top panel shows how the resulting probability of winning a dis-
trict is higher for the party whose expert faces a loyalist from the opposing party. In both
cases, parties always allocate experts around the most contestable district, that is, party L
in [λw,λΞ] and party R in [λε,λW].
With fewer experts to spare (µ < η/2), parties have to modify their allocation strategy. In
particular, party L will send experts to districts λk ∈ [λ0,λB], as shown in Figure 5 (bottom
panel). The intuition is the following. With only a few experts to allocate, party L could
still secure the favorable districts close to the pivotal one (as in the previous strategies), but
it would have to send loyalists to the other more favorable, albeit still contestable, districts.
This would leave them open to the competition by party R, which would have an incentive
to send there its experts, thereby turning these districts into its favor. Instead of using this
(losing) defensive strategy, party L will prefer to allocate its experts to the districts close
to the pivotal (λ0), which favor its opponent. And analogously for party R. Figure 5 (top
panel) shows how this oﬀensive strategy turns some of the districts originally close to party
R (namely, those between λ0 and λB) in favor of party L, and vice versa for the districts
between λb and λ0.
The results in Proposition 1 suggest that to increase the probability of winning the elec-
tion, parties (leaders) allocate their expert candidates close to the most contestable district,
λ0. The next corollary shows that this allocation strategy translates into more experts being
elected in contestable districts than elsewhere.
Corollary 1. The share of experts elected in the interval [λε,λΞ] around the most contestable
district, λ0, is (weakly) larger than the share of experts elected in [λ,λε]∪[λΞ,−λ], ∀λ < λε,
and thereby than the overall share of elected experts.
Proof. See Appendix.
To see this, consider the case of many experts (µ > η/2), where both parties send them to
the most contestable district interval [λε,λΞ]. Only experts are hence elected in that interval,
regardless of the realization of the popularity shock. With fewer experts (µ < η/2), again
13only experts would win in [λε,λΞ] for small realizations of the shock dW < δ < dw; but for
larger shocks only the winning part would elect experts (see Figure 5). The share of experts
in [λε,λΞ] would then be 1/2, which is still greater than the overall share of elected experts,
as long as the fraction of crucial districts (η) is lower than one.
4 The Data
4.1 Institutional Setup and Data Sources
In order to test the main empirical implications of the theoretical model presented in the
previous section, we use data about the members of the Italian parliament (House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate) from 1994 to 2006, which refer to legislative terms XII (1994-96), XIII
(1996-2001), and XIV (2001-06).13 During this period, Italy had a two-tier electoral system
(75% majoritarian and 25% proportional). In the majoritarian tier, members of parliament
were elected in single-member districts with plurality voting. In the proportional tier, they
were selected from closed party lists at the regional level (House) or from the best losers in
the majoritarian districts (Senate). Following the breakdown of the old party system and
the electoral reform in 1994, the political arena ﬁgured two major coalitions, center-right and
center-left: the former won the election in 1994 and 2001, and the latter in 1996.
Italy represents the ideal ground for evaluating the impact of political competition on po-
litical selection, because of some peculiar features of its institutional and political framework,
such as: 1) the majoritarian electoral system in place from 1994 to 2006; 2) one of the largest
legislative assemblies in the world (945 members of parliament against, for instance, 535 in
the US or 575 in France); 3) a great deal of geographic variation in the ideological strongholds
of the center-right and center-left coalitions. These features provide a considerable amount
of within-country variation in the degree of political contestability of the electoral districts,
which allows us to test the theoretical prediction at Corollary 1.
The dataset contains the following information on each member of parliament: demo-
graphic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, number of children, level and ﬁeld of
13For more information on the dataset, see Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2008). The original
sources used to collect the data include: the Annals of the Italian Parliament (La Navicella) for demographic
information, as well as professional and political experience; the Archive of Tax Returns of the members of
the Italian Parliament (Servizio Prerogative e Immunit` a) for income information; and the Italian Parliament
Press Oﬃce (Uﬃcio Stampa) for data on individual attendance at voting sessions.
14education); self-declared previous job (before entering parliament for the ﬁrst time); absen-
teeism rate (the share of electronic votes missed without any legitimate reason); parliament
appointments (president, vice president, and secretary either of the parliament or of a leg-
islative committee); government appointments (minister, vice minister); party aﬃliation and
political roles (member of the directive board of the party at the local, regional, or national
level); local government experience (mayor, city councillor, president of a region, etc.); tier
of election, electoral district, and margin of victory.
4.2 Measuring Political Competition
We restrict our analysis to politicians elected in majoritarian districts, where we can measure
the degree of political contestability, that is, the expected electoral gap between the two
major coalitions. There were 705 districts (475 in the House and 230 in the Senate) for each
legislative term. Hence, our sample could consist of at most 2,115 observations across the
three terms covered by the dataset. After dropping observations with missing values in the
relevant variables, we are left with a sample of 1,977 observations for terms XII-XIII-XIV
and 1,307 for terms XIII-XIV.
Table 1 shows that, in 25% of the districts, the center-left coalition won all three elections,
while the center-right always won in 34%. The remaining 40% swang at least once. Safe
(nonswing) districts are particularly concentrated in the North East and Center of the country
(see Table 2). The lagged margin of victory in absolute value (MV ) is an obvious measure
of the ex-ante contestability of the district: for example, if a coalition won by 30 percentage
points in the previous election, it will be very diﬃcult for the other coalition to ﬁght back
and win the district the next time. By the same token, alternative measures of the safeness
of a district could be MV being greater than 5 (Safe1) or greater than 10 (Safe2). The
distribution of the margin of victory in each single-member district—expressed in percentage
points—is positively skewed. In about 29% of the districts, the lagged margin of victory was
lower than 5, while in about 49% it was lower than 10.
All of these measures, based on the lagged margin of victory, should be good predictors
of the swinging probability of a district, but their correlation with the characteristics of the
individual candidates could be biased when the incumbent runs for reelection. In this case,
the lagged margin of victory would refer to an election run by the same politician, and thus
15partly depend on his skills. Furthermore, measures based on the lagged margin of victory
are not available for the XII legislative term, because the majoritarian districts were ﬁrst
introduced in this term. To address both issues, we construct an additional measure of
contestability by using the district-speciﬁc vote shares of diﬀerent parties at the European
elections, held either in 1994 or 1999. We consider as ideological (or loyal) voters those
who supported the center-left (L) or center-right coalition (R) in the previous European
election. These elections, in fact, were held under proportional representation to appoint
the Italian representatives in the European Parliament. Their turnout rate has usually been
lower than in national elections, because government decisions are not at stake. Political
analysts therefore agree that voters cast a more ideological vote in this type of electoral
contest. Our new measure of safeness (Safe3) is then equal to one if
1 − L − R
|L − R|
≤ 1. (6)
This measure can be interpreted as the empirical counterpart of 1/λk in the theoretical
model. Furthermore, it has the advantage of allowing us to identify changes in the degree
of contestability of a district due to national variations in political alliances, within each
coalition. Large modiﬁcations occured twice: in 1996 the rightist party Lega Nord quit
the center-right coalition because of alleged divergences over government policy; while the
leftist party Rifondazione Comunista quit the center-left coalition before the 2001 election.
These alliance breakdowns originated from the narrow incentive of the two small parties to
keep up their (proportional) vote share and bargaining power, and they developed around
struggles between the national leaderships. Their impact on the political future of back-
benchers and on the contestability of districts was not internalized. In fact, the breakdowns
were decided by the leaders of small parties, while they mainly aﬀected the destiny of the
representatives of big parties in marginal districts; moreover, political analysts agree that
the breakdowns followed purely proportionalistic motivations and were decided at the top of
the party structure. As a result, these national shocks altered the degree of contestability of
a few districts in a way that can be interpreted as suﬃciently exogenous with respect to the
characteristics of politicians previously elected in those districts.
Table 3 shows that all of our measures of ex-ante contestability are correlated with the
ex-post probability that a district swings from a coalition to the other. The probability of
16swinging is always higher when our safeness indicators are equal to zero, and the diﬀerences
are statistically signiﬁcant either at the 1% level (Safe1 and Safe2) or at the 5% level (Safe3).
The probability of swinging also increases with the lagged margin of victory.
4.3 Outcome Variables
The above measures of political competition represent our treatment of interest. We want to
evaluate whether increasing the intensity of such a treatment aﬀects the patterns of political
selection. In other words, we want to assess whether political parties allocate candidates
with diﬀerent ex-ante characteristics according to the degree of contestability of the district.
Table 4 summarizes the preelection characteristics of the politicians in our sample, according
to the contestability of the district where they were elected (as captured by the indicator
Safe2). On average, candidates allocated to nonsafe districts are more educated, have lower
parliament or government experience but greater local government experience, and declare
higher preelection incomes. Physicians tend to run in more contestable districts. Party
oﬃcers, on the contrary, are allocated to safer districts.
Table 5 summarizes information on the ex-post behaviors and appointments of the mem-
bers of parliament. Politicians elected in contestable districts tend to work harder in parlia-
ment, that is, they display a lower absenteeism rate in electronic votes, both overall and at
the end of the legislative term.14 It is worth noticing that politicians elected in contestable
districts have a higher probability to enter the government (if their coalition wins the general
election), although they have lower government experience than politicians running in safe
districts (see again Table 4). This is consistent with the view that those candidates are more
skilled than the others, and that they are rewarded for winning tougher races.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 The Impact of Political Competition on Selection
To evaluate whether any predetermined characteristic (Xijt) of politician i in district j at
time t is associated with the degree of contestability of the district where he is elected (Cijt),
14Only votes missed without any legitimate reason are considered (i.e., parliament missions or cabinet
meetings are not counted as absences). Electronic votes account for about 90% of total ﬂoor votes (almost
the totality if the vote was on a ﬁnal bill approval), the rest being held with hand counting.
17we implement the following set of regressions (depending on the measure used to capture
contestability):
Cijt = δt + γj + βXijt + ηijt, (7)
where regional dummies γj control for geographical factors correlated with both political
competition and political selection, δt for time ﬁxed eﬀects, and the error terms ηijt are
clustered at the individual level. If Cijt is a dummy, we estimate a Probit model; if it
is continuous, we use OLS. These estimations can be seen as a direct test of Corollary 1,
which suggests that experts (deﬁned on the basis of the available observable characteristics
discussed in the previous section) are more likely to be elected in contestable districts.
The estimation results are reported in Table 6. To control for the possible endogeneity
problem between Cijt and Xijt, which arises when Cijt is based on the lagged margin of victory,
and thus partly aﬀected by the skills of the incumbent who is now running for reelection, we
also restrict the sample to no incumbents only.15 To evaluate the eﬀect of preelection income,
we further restrict the sample to freshmen, because only for them preelection income refers
to private activity and can thus be interpreted as market skills (controlling for the previous
occupation).
The results show that more years of schooling, past local government experiences, and
higher preelection income increase the probability of running for election in a contestable
(nonsafe) district. In other words, the harsher political competition, the higher the proba-
bility that political parties rely on high-quality candidates, that is, politicians with higher
educational attainments or private income—both proxies for market skills—or politicians
who proved their political ability in subsequent rounds of local elections, seen here as “ﬁl-
ters” for politicians’ quality (i.e., competence or honesty) in a federal system (Cooter, 2002;
Myerson, 2006). Our results are robust to the use of diﬀerent contestability measures. In-
terestingly, when we use the entire sample, the results are statistically signiﬁcant only with
the Safe3 indicator, while the other indicators—based on the lagged margin of victory—turn
signiﬁcant only when we restrict the sample by dropping incumbents. This is consistent with
15In principle, the characteristics of a high-quality candidate, if matched with a high-quality opponent,
should not aﬀect the margin of victory in the district, but—as shown by the case with few experts (µ < η/2)
in the theoretical model—in some districts a high-quality candidate of a party could be matched by a
low-quality candidate of the other party: in these cases, the lagged margin of victory is aﬀected by the
characteristics of the incumbent who then runs for reelection. Focusing on no incumbents only, we can avoid
this potential problem and address the decision of parties to allocate freshmen in safe versus swing districts.
18the concern that the endogeneity discussed above could downward bias the estimate of the
association of political competition with candidates’ quality.
The estimates in Table 6 (using the Safe1 indicator) suggest that two more years of
schooling—equal to one standard deviation—increase the probability of running in a con-
testable district by 5.2 percentage points (that is, by about 7% with respect to the average).
Similarly, past administrative experiences lower the probability of running in a safe district
by 6.8 percentage points (that is, by about 9%). Looking at freshmen, even if we control
for previous job ﬁxed eﬀects, preelection income has a negative impact on the probability of
running in safe districts for two out of the four indicators. In particular, if we look at Safe2,
an increase in preelection income equal to one standard deviation (421,000 euros) reduces the
probability of running in a safe district by 35.4 percentage points (that is, by about 41%).
Also a lower increase of 100,000 euros produces a sizable eﬀect of 8.4 percentage points.
5.2 Convergence of Politicians’ Characteristics in Close Races
In the previous section, we showed that good politicians are more likely to run (and hence to
be elected) in contestable districts. But is this allocation strategy common to both political
coalitions? Is there any diﬀerence in political selection between the right and left? To shed
light on this point, we proceed in two steps. First, we look at any statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the observable characteristics of center-right versus center-left members of par-
liament. Second, we follow Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) and Lee (2008) and implement
a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) on the margin of victory in single-member dis-
tricts.16 Speciﬁcally, we calculate the margin of victory of the center-right coalition (MV R)
in each district: this measure is positive (negative) in all districts won by the center-right
(center-left) coalition. We then look at the predetermined characteristics (Xijt) of politician
i elected in district j at time t and ﬁt a third-order polynomial in MV R on either side of the
threshold MV R = 0, at which the electoral result sharply changes in favor of the center-right:






16Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) use the same identiﬁcation strategy to esti-
mate the impact of political parties on policy outcomes in the US and Sweden, respectively. We look instead
at political diﬀerences in candidates’ attributes in close electoral races.
19where Dijt = 1[MV Rijt > 0] and the error terms ψijt are clustered at the individual level.
The parameter τ identiﬁes the eﬀect of interest: that is, whether politicians running in close
races are intrinsically diﬀerent in their observable characteristics according to the political
coalition they belong to. The underlying assumption of this identiﬁcation strategy is that
electoral outcomes depend on both predictable elements (such as candidates’ skills) and
random chance, which is then crucial only for close races.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 7 reports the results for the whole sample of members of par-
liament. On average, left-wing politicians are older, less educated, feature a longer parlia-
ment tenure and more local government experiences. The right-wing coalition recruits more
entrepreneurs, self-employed, and lawyers; the left-wing coalition selects more professional
politicians, teachers, college professors, union representatives, and females.
The two main political coalitions thus show very diﬀerent patterns of political selection.
Yet, the RDD evidence shows that they both converge to the same (high-quality) type in
close races. The second panel of Table 7 reports the estimated discontinuity at a zero mar-
gin of victory, where there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between center-right and center-left
politicians in any demographic characteristic or previous market and political experience.
In particular, education, parliament tenure, gender, and local government experience, de-
spite being diﬀerent in the whole sample, are perfectly balanced in close races. Figures 6
through 8 provide a graphical representation of the estimated polynomials and of the jumps
at MV R = 0. These ﬁgures clearly show a pattern of convergence in the predetermined
attributes of political candidates. For instance, the center-left coalition has fewer candidates
with high educational attainments, but allocates all of them to marginal districts, where the
gap with the center-right coalition is thus ﬁlled. Only with respect to the previous occupa-
tions, the two coalitions may be supply constrained in certain characteristics, the center-left
selecting fewer entrepreneurs and self-employed, and the center-right fewer teachers and pro-
fessional politicians. These intrinsic diﬀerences remain also in close races.
5.3 The Impact of Political Competition on Eﬀort
To evaluate whether the degree of ex-ante contestability of a district (Cijt) aﬀects the in-oﬃce
eﬀort (Yijt) of politician i elected in district j at time t, we run the following set of regressions
20(depending on the measure used to capture contestability):
Yijt = δt + γj + τCijt + α1Xijt + α2Pijt + ijt (9)
where Xijt are the predetermined characteristics, Pijt represent additional post-election char-
acteristics aﬀecting the absenteeism rate Yijt (e.g., belonging to the majority coalition or
being appointed to a government position), γj and δt are regional and time dummies, and
the error terms ij are corrected for clustering at the individual level. The absenteeism rate is
a measure of shirking or rent-extraction, since it excludes absences with a legitimate reason;
moreover, we control for political appointments that may reduce parliament attendance. In
the subsample of freshmen, we also control for preelection income, which has been shown to be
a good predictor of outside income and shirking in parliamentary activity (see Gagliarducci,
Nannicini, and Naticchioni, 2008).
By estimating the impact of ex-ante political competition on the future performance of
elected oﬃcials, we want to assess whether the positive eﬀect of electoral competition on
selection leads also to better political outcomes, that is, whether more skilled candidates
perform better once in oﬃce. Table 8 reports the estimation results. The empirical evidence
shows that politicians elected in contestable districts display a lower absenteeism rate in
electronic parliament votes. If we look at the Safe1 indicator in the subsample with no
incumbents, running in a contestable district reduces the ex-post absences by 5 percentage
points (that is, by about 16% with respect to the average). The eﬀect is always signiﬁcant
at the 1% or 5% level, irrespective of the contestability measure we use.17
These ﬁndings may be driven by selection, but may also have an alternative explanation:
members of parliament facing tougher political competition might choose to exert more eﬀort
in order to gain reelection. To disentangle whether the higher productivity of politicians
elected in contestable districts arises from the selection of better candidates or from diﬀerent
reelection incentives, we exploit the (exogenous) changes in national coalitions discussed in
Section 4.2, which altered the degree of contestability of certain districts from one election
to the next. In Table 9, Safe3 is constructed as before (see equation 6), while Safe3-next
uses the same method but refers to the next election (keeping into account the variations
17Since the absenteeism rate is bounded between 0 and 1, we also implemented the GLM estimator proposed
by Papke and Wooldridge (1996); the results—available upon request—are almost identical to the OLS
estimates reported in Table 8.
21that occured in the political alliances within coalitions). As outcome variable, we use the
absenteeism rate during the last year of the legislative term, because at that time the new
electoral coalitions are known and reelection incentives are probably at their maximum.
Column (1) shows that the eﬀect of the ex-ante contestability (Safe3) remains strong:
even if we control for future reelection incentives (Safe3-next), good politicians—elected in
contestable districts—reduce their absences by 8.2 percentage points (about 35% with respect
to the last-year average). Columns (2) and (3) conﬁrm this result: (bad) politicians elected in
safe districts make more absences at the end of the legislative term, both when their district
has turned contestable and when it has remained safe. Selection hence matters. Similarly,
in columns (3) and (4), we look at the impact of the future contestability of the district on
last-year absences, controlling for the ex-ante contestability. As expected from the result in
column (1), incentives are less relevant. Yet, there is still some evidence of an additional
accountability eﬀect for low-quality politicians: indeed, if a safe district turns contestable,
(bad) politicians tend to exert more eﬀort (by 4.1 percentage points, about 17%). But
the opposite does not hold: (good) politicians elected in contestable districts show a high
productivity even when their district turns safe.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we address a recurring question in political economy: is electoral competition
as quality enhancing as economic competition? Our suggestion is that not only the answer
is positive, but that this could be due to the selection of high-quality candidates by political
parties that want to attract non-aligned voters.
Our theoretical model provides a crucial role to the parties in selecting and allocating
politicians to the diﬀerent electoral districts. Hence, we disregard the type of self-selection
by individuals studied in the citizen-candidate framework and analyze the eﬀect of political
competition on party selection. Our ideological parties select party loyalists and experts—
who are highly valued by the swing voters—into districts in an attempt to increase their
probability of winning the election. Political competition pushes political parties to allocate
experts to the most contestable districts.
22The ground ﬁeld to test this prediction is the Italian majoritarian political system between
1994 and 2006. And the empirical evidence conﬁrms it. Ex-ante quality, as measured for
instance by years of schooling, previous market income, and local government experience,
increases the probability of running in a contestable district. Evidence from a regression
discontinuity design shows that, despite being diﬀerent on average, the characteristics of
the two major political coalitions converge to high-quality levels in close races. Politicians
elected in nonsafe districts have also a better level of ex-post quality, as measured by their
absenteeism rate in parliament. This eﬀort eﬀect is driven more by the selection of better
politicians than by reelection incentives. Accountability does however play an additional
role, at least for low-quality candidates: if a safe district turns contestable, politicians tend
to exert more eﬀort. Yet, high-quality politicians, elected in contestable districts, do not
reduce their ex-post productivity even when their district becomes safe.
Our results have normative implications. They suggest the adoption of institutions and
policies aimed at enhancing both political competition and voters’ information on the quality
of individual candidates. For example, in a majoritarian system, the amount of ex-ante
contestability could be increased by an “optimal” gerrymandering that evens out the relative
shares of the main parties’ ideological voters across electoral districts. We leave the study of
these implications to future research.
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I) as the mass of districts in the interval ΛL
i . Parties’
objective in allocating their experts is to maximize the probability of winning the election,
i.e., of winning more than 50% of the districts. Consider party L. Its probability of winning a












−λk. Thus, party L allocates experts to districts





in the marginal districts. These are the district(s) such that,
given the shock, winning the district(s) increases the probability of winning the election. For











and party L probability of winning the election would be δ < −λ0, so that the interval of
districts around λ0 would be pivotal.
Consider ﬁrst the case that parties have enough experts to span the interval between λw
and λ0, i.e., µ > η/2. Consider an allocation ΛL by party L which includes ΛL
i s.t. [λw,λΞ] ⊂
ΛL
i . It is easy to see that an allocation ΛR by party R which includes ΛR
i s.t. [λε,λW] ⊂ ΛR
i is a
best response to ΛL. In fact, given ΛL, by sending its experts to the interval [λε,λW], party R
restores its probability of winning the election to 1/2. In particular, party R wins the election
for δ > 0, and L for δ < 0. Allocating additional experts may modify the share of seats won
by party R, but not its probability of winning the election. The same reasoning shows that
ΛL with ΛL
i s.t. [λw,λΞ] ⊂ ΛL
i is a best response to ΛR with ΛR
i s.t. [λε,λW] ⊂ ΛR
i . Hence,
a pair of allocations ΛL, including ΛL
























= µ, are a Nash equilibrium
of the allocation game.
To prove than any equilibrium allocation ΛL has to include ΛL
i s.t. [λw,λΞ] ⊂ ΛL
i , consider
ﬁrst an allocation b ΛL with b ΛL
i = [λi
I,λi
II] s.t. 0 > λi
I > λw and λi
II > λΞ, and no other experts
in [λw,λI]. Party-R best response is to allocate its experts in [λw,λI]∪[λ0,λII]. Following this
strategy, party R wins the election with a probability greater than 1/2, since for δ = 0 party
R wins all districts with λ > 0 (and hence 50%), but also the districts in [λw,λI]. Hence,
b ΛL cannot be part of an equilibrium since simply matching the previous best response by
party R would give party L 50% probability of winning the election. Finally, it is trivial to













∈ [λΞ,λW]. Party-R best response would be
ΛR such that ΛR
i = [λε,λW], which yields party R a winning probability greater than 1/2.
Hence, b ΛL cannot be part of an equilibrium.
For µ ≤ η/2, suppose that party L allocates its experts to [λ0,λB]. What is party-
R best response? To re-establish its probability of winning the election to 1/2, party R
27can send its experts to [λb,λ0]. As displayed in ﬁgure 5, party L wins the election for
δ < max[−λB,−λb − W], party R for δ > min[−λb,−λB + W], and the election is tied for
δ ∈ [−λB,−λb]. Finally, notice that party R cannot increase its probability of winning the
election above 1/2 by allocation experts in other districts (see ﬁgure 5). Hence, party-L
allocation in [λ0,λB] and party-R allocation in [λb,λ0] is an equilibrium.
To prove that no other equilibrium allocation exists, ﬁrst notice that allocating experts
outside the interval [λw,λW] is never part of an equilibrium, since it does not modify the
probability of winning election, which can instead be achieved by allocating experts in this
interval. Consider party-L allocation ΛL = [λb,λ0]. Party-R best response would be to
allocate experts [λw,λb], which would yield party R a winning probability above 1/2, since
for δ = 0 party R would win in districts with λ > 0 and in [λw,λb]. The same reasoning
applies to any b ΛL = [λI,λII] s.t. λI ∈ [λw,λ0), λII ∈ [λw,λb) and G(λII)−G(λI) = µ. And
to b ΛL = [λI,λW] and G(λW) − G(λI) = µ.
Proof of Corollary 2
First, simply notice that by Proposition 1 for µ > η/2 the share of experts in the interval
[λε,λΞ] is 100%. Second, notice that for µ ≤ η/2, given the equilibrium allocations described
in Proposition 1, the share of experts in the interval [λε,λΞ] could be equal to 50% when
only the experts of the winning party are elected. Then, the share of experts elected in
[λ,λε] ∪ [λΞ,−λ] ∀λ < λε is (weakly) less than 50% and so is the share of elected experts.
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Notes. Left stands for victory of the center-left coalition; Right
stands for victory of the center-right coalition; Other means vic-
tory of at least one third-coalition candidate. The ﬁrst, second,
and third term in each pattern refer to the XII, XIII, and XIV
legislative term, respectively.
Table 2: Swing districts according to geographic location
No swing Swing
(percent) (percent)
North West 70.49 29.51





Notes. Swing is equal to one if the winner belongs to a diﬀer-
ent coalition with respect to the incumbent. ISTAT geographic
classiﬁcation. Legislative terms XIII and XIV; 1,410 districts.





















Notes. Swing is equal to one if the winner belongs to a diﬀerent
coalition with respect to the incumbent. Margin of victory is the
lagged margin of victory in the single-member district. Safe1 is
equal to one if the lagged margin is greater than 5 percentage
points. Safe2 is equal to one if the lagged margin is greater than
10 percentage points. Safe3 is equal to one if (1 − L − R)/|L −
R| < 1, where L (R) captures the expected share of voters for
the center-left (center-right) coalition, estimated by means of
ideological votes at the previous European elections. Legislative
terms XIII and XIV; 1,410 districts.
30Table 4: Ex-ante characteristics of the members of parliament
Safe2
No Yes Diﬀerence -diﬀ95% +diﬀ95%
Male 0.928 0.906 0.022 -0.007 0.051
Age 51.416 50.728 0.688 -0.289 1.665
Married 0.824 0.791 0.033 -0.009 0.074
Years of schooling 16.103 15.754 0.349 0.132 0.567
Freshman 0.458 0.387 0.071 0.019 0.122
Incumbent 0.277 0.351 -0.074 -0.122 -0.025
Parliament appointment 0.098 0.151 -0.054 -0.088 -0.019
Govt. appointment 0.065 0.111 -0.046 -0.076 -0.017
Local govt. experience 0.608 0.558 0.050 -0.001 0.102
Preelection income 0.113 0.083 0.029 0.005 0.053
Lawyer 0.164 0.132 0.032 -0.006 0.069
Party oﬃcer 0.053 0.090 -0.037 -0.064 -0.010
Teacher 0.088 0.077 0.011 -0.018 0.040
Clerk 0.029 0.051 -0.022 -0.043 -0.001
Physician 0.094 0.061 0.032 0.004 0.061
Entrepreneur 0.091 0.095 -0.005 -0.035 0.026
Self employed 0.092 0.098 -0.006 -0.037 0.025
Executive 0.089 0.097 -0.008 -0.038 0.023
Professor 0.091 0.118 -0.027 -0.060 0.005
Bureaucrat 0.075 0.064 0.011 -0.016 0.037
Union representative 0.023 0.023 0.001 -0.015 0.016
Journalist 0.069 0.064 0.005 -0.022 0.031
Notes. Safe2 is equal to one if the lagged margin of victory is greater than 10 percentage points. -diﬀ95% and
+diﬀ95% represent the lower and upper bound of the 95% conﬁdence interval of Diﬀerence, respectively. All
variables are dummies, except Age, Years of schooling, and Preelection income (in million of euros, 2004 prices).
Freshman means that the previous parliamentary tenure is zero. Parliament appointment captures whether the
politician has previously been president or vice president of the parliament, or of a single committee. Government
appointment captures whether the politician has previously been minister or vice minister. Local Government
Experience stands for previous institutional experience at the local level (e.g., mayor). Preelection income is the
total taxable income in the year before election (freshmen only). Job dummies refer to the preelection occupation
and the omitted category includes blue collars and students. Legislative terms XIII and XIV; 1,307 observations.
31Table 5: Absences and appointments of the members of parliament
Safe2
No Yes Diﬀerence -diﬀ95% +diﬀ95%
Absenteeism rate:
– whole term 0.228 0.363 -0.135 -0.162 -0.109
– last year 0.206 0.264 -0.059 -0.086 -0.031
Future parl. appointment 0.151 0.151 0.000 -0.041 0.042
Future govt. appointment 0.085 0.038 0.047 0.022 0.072
Notes. Safe2 is equal to one if the lagged margin of victory is greater than 10 percentage points. -diﬀ95%
and +diﬀ95% represent the lower and upper bound of the 95% conﬁdence interval of Diﬀerence, respectively.
Absenteeism rate is the percentage of votes missed without any legitimate reason. Future parliament appointment
captures whether the politician becomes president or vice president of the parliament, or of a single committee, after
the election. Future government appointment captures whether the politician becomes minister or vice minister










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 7: Partisan diﬀerences in political selection, all versus close races
All sample Polynomial in MV R ∈ [−25,+25]
Diﬀerence Std.Err. Discontinuity Std.Err.
Right vs. Left Right vs. Left
Male 0.059*** [0.013] 0.009 [0.042]
Age -0.804* [0.427] -0.643 [1.549]
Married 0.006 [0.019] 0.063 [0.063]
Years of schooling 0.327*** [0.095] 0.13 [0.290]
Freshman 0.106*** [0.023] -0.013 [0.076]
Parl. appointment -0.039*** [0.013] 0.008 [0.043]
Govt. appointment -0.016 [0.011] 0.000 [0.034]
Local govt. experience -0.039* [0.023] 0.033 [0.079]
Preelection Income 0.056 [0.035] 0.011 [0.048]
Lawyer 0.119*** [0.016] 0.019 [0.060]
Politician -0.125*** [0.011] -0.076** [0.034]
Teacher -0.059*** [0.013] -0.153*** [0.053]
Clerk -0.054*** [0.009] 0.012 [0.028]
Physician 0.025* [0.013] 0.06 [0.048]
Entrepreneur 0.137*** [0.013] 0.077* [0.040]
Selfemp 0.091*** [0.014] 0.111** [0.048]
Manager 0.022* [0.012] 0.077* [0.041]
Professor -0.092*** [0.014] -0.089* [0.046]
Bureaucrat -0.002 [0.011] -0.003 [0.037]
Union representative -0.033*** [0.006] -0.029 [0.018]
Journalist -0.005 [0.011] 0.033 [0.032]
Obs. 1,919 1,656
Notes. Diﬀerence is the diﬀerence between the average characteristics of center-right politicians and the average
characteristics of center-left politicians in all districts. Discontinuity is the estimated diﬀerence for close races,
i.e., the discontinuity at zero of a split 3rd-order polynomial in the margin of victory of the center-right coalition
(MV R), ﬁtted over the interval MV R ∈ [−25,+25]. Standard errors are in brackets. Signiﬁcance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. All dependent variables are dummies,
except Age, Years of schooling, and Preelection income (in million of euros, 2004 prices). Freshman means that the
previous parliamentary tenure is zero. Parliament appointment captures whether the politician has previously been
president or vice president of the parliament, or of a single committee. Government appointment captures whether
the politician has previously been minister or vice minister. Local Government Experience stands for previous
institutional experience at the local level (e.g., mayor). Preelection income is the total taxable income in the year
before election (freshmen only). Job dummies refer to the preelection occupation and the omitted category includes



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 9: Political competition and absences in the last year of the term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All sample Safe3-next=0 Safe3-next=1 Safe3=0 Safe3=1
Safe3 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.063*
[0.016] [0.021] [0.034]
Safe3-next 0.011 -0.039 0.041**
[0.015] [0.027] [0.020]
Majority coalition -0.042*** -0.117*** 0.036 -0.107*** -0.008
[0.014] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.019]
Male -0.002 -0.008 0.006 -0.002 0.002
[0.027] [0.031] [0.037] [0.038] [0.037]
Age -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Married 0.015 -0.003 0.040 -0.046* 0.043*
[0.018] [0.021] [0.025] [0.025] [0.022]
Years of schooling 0.000 0.007 -0.007 0.010 -0.005
[0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Parl. appointment 0.029 -0.022 0.111*** -0.018 0.041
[0.025] [0.029] [0.042] [0.037] [0.032]
Govt. appointment 0.080** 0.069* 0.118* 0.089** 0.071
[0.034] [0.037] [0.061] [0.045] [0.044]
Local govt. experience -0.009 -0.017 0.014 -0.047** 0.015
[0.015] [0.019] [0.023] [0.023] [0.020]
Job ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Region ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Obs. 902 525 377 326 576
Notes. Dependent variable: absenteeism rate in the last year of the legislative term. OLS estimations. House of Representatives
only. Safe3 is equal to one if (1 − L − R)/|L − R| < 1, where L (R) captures the expected share of voters for the center-left
(center-right) coalition, estimated by means of the votes at the previous European elections (available for legislative terms XII,
XIII, and XIV). Safe3-next is calculated in the same way but keeping into account the variations in national political coalitions
at the following election, in order to capture reelection incentives. Job ﬁxed eﬀects refer to the preelection occupation (see Table
4). Region ﬁxed eﬀects refer to ISTAT geographic classiﬁcation (see Table 2). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual
level in brackets. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
36Figure 1: Distribution of districts and probability of winning the election
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If δ < 0 party L wins all districts with λk <0
Figure 2: Allocation of experts and probability of winning, pivotal districts
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Figure 4: Allocation of experts and probability of winning if µ > η/2, second case






















































38Figure 5: Allocation of experts and probability of winning if µ < η/2






























































































































MV of the Right
Notes. The solid line is a split 3rd-order polynomial in the margin of victory of the center-right coalition (MV R),
ﬁtted over the interval MV R ∈ [−25,+25]; see also Table 7. The dashed lines are the 95% conﬁdence interval of the
polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 1-unit intervals; points to the left (right) of the vertical line at zero refer
to left-wing (right-wing) politicians. Legislative terms XII, XIII, and XIV; 1,656 observations.


















































































































MV of the Right
Notes. The solid line is a split 3rd-order polynomial in the margin of victory of the center-right coalition (MV R),
ﬁtted over the interval MV R ∈ [−25,+25]; see also Table 7. The dashed lines are the 95% conﬁdence interval of the
polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 1-unit intervals; points to the left (right) of the vertical line at zero refer
to left-wing (right-wing) politicians. Legislative terms XII, XIII, and XIV; 1,656 observations.



















































































































































































































































MV of the Right
Notes. The solid line is a split 3rd-order polynomial in the margin of victory of the center-right coalition (MV R), ﬁtted over
the interval MV R ∈ [−25,+25]; see also Table 7. The dashed lines are the 95% conﬁdence interval of the polynomial. Scatter
points are averaged over 1-unit intervals; points to the left (right) of the vertical line at zero refer to left-wing (right-wing)
politicians. Legislative terms XII, XIII, and XIV; 1,656 observations.
42